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Abstract 
Semiconductor manufacturing defects adversely affect yield and reliability. 
Manufacturers expend vast resources to reduce defects within their processes. As the 
minimum feature size get smaller, defects become increasingly difficult to prevent. 
Defects can change the behavior of a logic circuit resulting in a fault. Manufacturers and 
designers may improve yield, reliability, and profitability by using design techniques that 
make products robust even in the presence of faults. Triple modular redundancy (TMR) is 
a fault tolerant technique commonly used to mask faults using voting outcomes from 
three processing elements (PE). TMR is effective at masking errors as long as no more 
than a single processing element is faulty. 
Time distributed voting (TDV) is proposed as an active fault tolerant technique. 
TDV addresses the shortcomings of triple modular redundancy (TMR) in the presence of 
multiple faulty processing elements. A faulty PE may not be incorrect 100% of the time. 
When a faulty element generates correct results, a majority is formed with the healthy PE. 
TDV observes voting outcomes over time to make a statistical decision whether a PE is 
healthy or faulty. In simulation, fault coverage is extended to 98.6% of multiple faulty PE 
cases. As an active fault tolerant technique, TDV identifies faulty PE’s so that actions 
may be taken to replace or disable them in the system. TDV may provide a positive 
impact to semiconductor manufacturers by improving yield and reliability even as fault 
frequency increases.
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
The integrated circuit has become commonplace in nearly every facet of modern 
civilization. Innovations to the integrated circuit, over several decades, have led to 
advances in computing, communication, education, entertainment, health care, travel, and 
weaponry. Semiconductor manufacturers relentlessly pursue smaller feature sizes and 
lower power consumption to reduce costs and increase the capability of products they 
produce. The feature size refers to the dimensions used when printing circuitry on a 
semiconductor part using a photolithography process. Transistor gate length, metal-wire 
width and the placement pitch are semiconductor features that can be minimized in order 
to fit more circuitry into a given area. Smaller feature size allows for greater transistor 
density and component integration. For example, CPU manufacturers like Intel and AMD 
are now integrating essential computer components from chipsets and expansion cards 
directly into the CPU. Products exist today in which the memory controller hub, PCI-
Express interface, graphics processor, caches, and multimedia encoder/decoder are 
fabricated directly on the CPU die. Integration is possible and cost effective because a 
smaller feature size allows for greater circuit density with a fixed manufacturing cost. 
Semiconductor manufacturers must be mindful of random manufacturing defects 
as they attempt to shrink the feature size. A random defect is an imperfection introduced 
during the fabrication process. Defects can be attributed to impurities in the crystalline 
structure, particles, equipment malfunction, variations in temperature or pressure, or 
variations in the process. Random defects appear in different shapes and sizes. Some 
defects are too small to adversely affect the circuit. Larger defects may cause shorts or 
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opens in the circuitry, resulting in failures or faults. Defects larger than one-tenth the 
minimum feature size may cause rare faults. Typical manufacturing processes guard 
against defects that are larger than one-third of the minimum feature size [2] as they are 
most likely to cause faults. Defect density (λ) is specified in units of defects per unit area 
and impacts the frequency of defects large enough to cause a fault. 
Typically, each new process generation reduces the minimum feature size. As the 
minimum feature size gets smaller, the impact of random defect size and density 
increases. The manufacturing process must continually improve in order to keep defect 
density at an acceptable level [2]. Figure 1 shows the decrease in allowable defect density 
and size with respect to the minimum feature size [2]. Figure 1 shows that, as minimum 
the feature size (x-axis) decreases, the allowable defect density (left axis) decreases. The 
size of defect included in defect density (right axis) also decreases, but at a faster rate 
than defect density. The implication of Figure 1 is that designs using a smaller feature 
size are susceptible to failure due to smaller defects. The problem is compounded by the 
reality that smaller defects occur at a higher relative frequency than large defects as 
shown in Figure 2 [2]. Acceptable defect density will become increasingly difficult to 
achieve with each successive process generation. 
Manufacturers employ techniques to improve manufacturing yield and product 
reliability in the presence of faults. Lockstep triple modular redundancy (TMR) is one 
such technique.  Lockstep TMR utilizes triplicated processing elements (PE) and majority 
voting to mask faults. As long as a majority of PE’s are fault-free, majority voting will 
mask erroneous results and only propagate correct results [5]. Lockstep TMR may 
preserve manufacturing yield or provide fault tolerance against online faults [4]. When 
  
3 
one of the PEs contains a fault, whether from a manufacturing defect or an online failure, 
the remaining two PE’s form a majority and evict or mask the erroneous result.          
 
Figure 1: Defect density and size with respect to the minimum feature size [2]. 
As the minimum feature size (X-axis) gets smaller, defect density (left-axis) 
decreases, and the size of defect included in defect density (right-axis) also 
decreases. 
 
 
Figure 2: Relative frequency of defects with respect to size [2]. 
 
Designers that utilize TMR assume that, at most, only a single PE ever contains a 
fault [6]. If multiple faulty elements are present, aliasing may occur. Aliasing is when 
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two faulty results form a majority and evict the correct result. Figure 3 shows a simple 
example of how aliasing occurs. Figure 3 shows three PE’s performing the function of a 
two-input NAND gate. The Golden element contains no fault, while Faulty1 and Faulty2 
elements each contain different faults. In this work, faults are modeled as stuck-at-0 
(SA0) or stuck-at-1 (SA1). The node where the fault occurs is constrained to the stuck-at 
value, independent of the logic around it. The truth table shows that for the input pattern 
(A=0, B=1), Faulty1 and Faulty2 elements both generate faulty results that form a voting 
majority. In this simple example, the correct result would be evicted and the faulty result 
would be propagated because of its majority status. 
Some fault pairs are expected to generate aliased results. Faults that modify 
circuit behavior in the same way are called, equivalent, dominant, or collapsible faults. 
For example, if one PE contained a SA1 on the input of an inverter and another PE 
contained a SA0 on the output of the same inverter, both PE’s would exhibit the same 
syndrome and the faults would be equivalent. When activated by an input pattern, 
equivalent faults generate aliased results because they are, in effect, the same faulty 
circuit. The faults displayed in Figure 3, are not equivalent, dominant, or collapsible, yet 
they generate aliased results. Aliasing extends beyond equivalent fault pairs and presents 
a challenge to hardware redundancy in the presence of multiple faults. Future 
technologies may produce devices so small that achievable defect density cannot protect 
against the likelihood of multiple faulty PE’s in a TMR system. Additionally, if TMR is 
used to protect yield, any online fault may constitute the second faulty PE [4].  
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C
A
B
SA1
SA0
C
A
B
C
A
B
Golden
Faulty 1
Faulty 2  
Truth Table 
A B C [Golden] C [Faulty 1] C [Faulty 2] 
0 0 1 0 1 
0 1 1 0 0 
1 0 1 0 1 
1 1 0 0 0 
Figure 3: Example of Aliasing when multiple processing elements are faulty. 
The faults shown in Faulty 1 and Faulty 2 circuits are not equivalent or collapsible, 
but they still generate identical faulty results. 
  
In most cases, even a faulty PE is correct part of the time. When a faulty PE 
generates correct results, it votes in favor of the non-faulty PE. If two PE’s are faulty, but 
not generating aliased results, a statistical, time-distributed voting model may be able to a 
correctly identify the non-faulty PE by observing which element(s) are in the majority 
most of the time. 
This thesis will explore the impact of multiple faulty PE’s in a TMR system and 
propose a time-distributed voting model to extend the usefulness of TMR to systems with 
multiple faulty PE’s. The proposed design is effective for multiple faulty PE’s as long as 
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they do not contain aliasing fault pairs. The design will also enable each PE instance to 
operate on its own independent data stream. This thesis will summarize the potential for 
improved throughput and efficiency, while remaining fault tolerant against single and 
multiple faults using modified TMR methods. 
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Chapter 2 Background 
2.1 Semiconductor Defects and Faults 
In the semiconductor manufacturing process, an imperfection that occurs during 
processing is called a defect.  When a defect modifies the behavior of a given circuit to 
the point of failure, it becomes a fault. There are a large variety of defects that can cause 
faults. Figure 4 from [2] shows examples of two defects that commonly cause faults 
during the manufacturing process. These include a defect shorting two metal lines 
together (Figure 4a) and a void in a metal line resulting in an open (Figure 4b). 
 
Figure 4: Conductor Defects [2]. 
(a) Short between parallel metal lines, material deposited where it should not be. 
(b) Open metal line, material not deposited where it should be. 
 
Defects do not always result in faults. There is a close relationship between defect 
size and fault occurrence. This relationship is largely dependent on the minimum feature 
size of the process. If a defect is much smaller than the minimum feature size defined 
within a process, then the likelihood of it causing a fault is small. The small defect may 
be permanently contained within the part and never cause any adverse effect. However, if 
a defect is close to or larger than the minimum feature size, then the probability of it 
causing a fault increases. As the manufacturing process continues to evolve, smaller 
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transistors, and denser designs will become more sensitive to smaller defects that are 
increasingly difficult to prevent.  
A defect may induce a fault that renders the part defective at the completion of the 
manufacturing process. When the fault is observed during test, the part is rejectedas a 
yield loss. Conversely, a part may pass initial testing and then fail during its useful 
lifetime due to latent faults. Examples of common defects that cause latent faults are 
shown in Figure 5 [2]. In Figure 5a, a metal line with a partial non-conductive void may 
behave as expected during test, but the reduced cross-sectional area of the line results in 
higher current density. Over time, the higher current density stresses the line causing it to 
fail due to electro migration resulting in an open circuit. In Figure 5b, metal lines with a 
conductive particle partially bridging the gap between them increases the electric field 
through the insulator when differential voltages are present. Over time this increased 
electric field breaks down the insulator separating the metal lines and the lines become 
shorted together. In both of these cases as with a myriad of failure models, the part may 
not actually fail until a significant amount of time has passed in normal operation. 
 
Figure 5: Illustration of defects that cause latent faults [2]. 
(a) Defect causing a clear field in the metal line, resulting in current crowding. 
(b) Defect leaving material between two metal lines causing high electric field. 
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Manufacturers must guard against defects that may cause manufacturing and 
latent faults. Semiconductor defect density describes the average number of random 
defects per unit area that are likely to cause faults. Defect density is a critical indicator of 
process health and yield [2][4]. Poisson statistics are used to predict yield fallout from 
defects. If circuit area and the defect density for a manufacturing process are known, the 
probability of observing exactly n defects is calculated by the equation shown in Figure 
6e. The Poisson equation in Figure 6e assumes random defects to be uniformly 
distributed. 
  = 	 (a) 
  = 	
		 (b) 
 
 =

	
= 	 
(c) 
  = 	 = 			 (d) 
 
,  =

!
exp	− 
(e) 
Figure 6: Poisson statistics 
P(n,λ) computes the probability that the part contains exactly n defects when 
average number of defects per unit (λ) is known. 
 
Slight increases in defect density may have a large impact on yield. Designs that 
are salvageable in the presence of defects and faults help to mitigate the otherwise costly 
yield fallout. Several strategies, including hardware redundancy, exist which allow a 
circuit to continue to operate or gracefully degrade when faults occur. The next two 
sections will review fault tolerance and hardware redundancy as viable design 
methodologies to manage circuit operation in the presence of faults. 
  
10 
2.2 Redundancy and Fault Tolerance 
Semiconductor manufacturers go to great lengths to reduce defects within their 
process, but defects cannot be eliminated completely. Manufacturers can minimize the 
effect defects have on yield and reliability by utilizing hardware redundancy in their 
designs. Redundancy refers to the use of multiple processing elements (PE) to handle 
failures. If one instance fails, a redundant element may be used to accomplish the task. 
Redundancy is utilized in systems across many disciplines to improve reliability. A 
suspension bridge utilizes redundant support cables to distribute the load evenly and 
ensure the bridge does not collapse if a single cable fails. Hospitals use backup power 
generators to supply power during a utility outage. Hard drives can be configured in a 
RAID array such that no data is lost if a single drive fails. In all these cases the goal of 
the designers is to avoid undesired behavior due to a single point of failure. 
Semiconductor manufacturers use redundancy to make designs more robust. 
When fabrication of a design is complete the part is tested. If individual components in 
the part are faulty, the part may be repaired by activating a redundant component or 
utilizing an alternate data path. When repair is not possible, faulty components may be 
disabled and the part sold at a lower price or used for an alternate purpose. For example, 
the part may have less cache available, or may have a graphics or audio module disabled; 
however, it need not be wholly scrapped. 
Hardware redundancy is used by semiconductor manufacturers to account for 
latent and online faults. Latent faults are undetectable when the part is initially tested, but 
fail during the part’s useful lifetime. Fault tolerance is a design methodology which 
enables a part to continue to operate after a fault has occurred. Active and passive 
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techniques exist for achieving fault tolerance. The passive technique attempts to mask 
faulty results as they occur. The active technique attempts to identify faulty hardware and 
remove it from the system [6]. N-Modular Redundancy (NMR) is an example of a 
passive technique. NMR uses multiple PE’s and majority voting to mask erroneous 
results and prevent them from getting propagated. As long as a majority of PE’s is 
healthy, majority voting can effectively mask errors [6]. 
2.3 Lockstep TMR 
Lockstep Triple modular redundancy (TMR) is a passive NMR approach in which 
only three PE’s are used with majority voting to select the correct result [6]. Figure 7 
graphically shows data flow through a (TMR) fault tolerant system containing a single 
faulty PE (dotted-line). Since two of the PE’s are healthy, the faulty result gets discarded 
when the vote is executed. The voting algorithm is executed continuously. Each output is 
verified by majority to ensure it is correct. Majority voting may be conducted at the bit 
level or the word level depending on the application. Word level voting compares PE 
results in their entirety. An indeterminate state may be reached if all three PE’s compute 
different results. Bit level voting generates the system output using a majority 
determination from each bitwise comparison of the PE results. Bit-level voting does not 
allow for indeterminate states when multiple PE’s are faulty. When only a single PE is 
faulty, Lockstep TMR will obtain the correct output value using bit level or word level 
voting.  Lockstep TMR becomes unreliable or indeterminate when multiple PE’s are 
faulty. TMR may improve yield fallout by masking faults caused by manufacturing 
defects. When one element in a TMR system is already faulty due to a manufacturing 
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defect and a second element incurs an online or latent fault during normal operation, 
majority voting is no longer able to identify the correct result [6]. Majority voting in a 
TMR system is only guaranteed to be correct when a single element is faulty. Multiple 
faulty PE’s may produce identical yet incorrect results. Aliasing occurs when two 
identical, yet incorrect results form a majority and evict or mask the correct result. When 
aliasing occurs, the TMR system propagates erroneous data without detection.  
 
Figure 7: A 16-bit multiplier TMR implementation. 
Three 16-bit multiplier modules operate on the same input data. Module 0 is faulty. 
Modules 1 & 2 are not faulty and form a majority. The faulty result from module 0 
is masked at the output. 
 
The yield and reliability benefits of TMR come at a cost. Additional area is 
required for the redundant PE’s and voting algorithm. Additional power is required to 
compute triplicated results and execute the voting algorithm for every input cycle. TMR 
does not conduct a thorough check of all possible faults in the PE. The only faults that are 
Input
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checked are those that are activated by the input patterns. Faults existing within one or 
more PE’s may remain dormant and unobserved by the voting algorithm if no input is 
presented to activate the fault. 
Space compaction is a compression technique which attempts to propagate any 
errors in a circuit from input to output [1]. Compaction generates a signature key to 
uniquely identify a distinct fault state in the circuit. In a triple redundant system with 
signature keys generated for each PE, faults are detectable if keys form a majority. 
However, when multiple PE's are faulty, a different signature key will be generated for 
each PE. Space compaction does not provide reliable detection of multiple faulty PE's 
because a vote on three different signature keys would return an ambiguous outcome.  
In safety critical devices, an emergency is the worst time to discover a previously 
undetected fault. Some input patterns that would activate faults within critical circuitry 
occur rarely online. For example, the defibrillation circuitry in an implantable 
cardioverter defibrillator (ICD) is activated only when a dangerous rhythm is detected in 
the heart. This circuitry delivers an electric shock to return the heart to a normal sinus 
rhythm. Even though this defibrillation circuitry is rarely used, if it malfunctions at the 
onset of a heart attack or other cardiac event, the results could be catastrophic. TMR 
operates only on the input patterns received while online. A failure in the defibrillation 
circuitry due to multiple faulty elements would be undetectable until a cardiac event 
actually occurs. A preferable fault tolerant approach would be to continually test for 
faults in the entire system and identify failures, while there is time and opportunity to 
respond to them. 
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2.4 Fault Cones and Aliasing  
Designers of TMR systems assume that, at most, only one processing element is 
faulty. When this assumption fails, aliasing may occur. Aliasing at either the bit level or 
the word level occurs when two faulty results agree forming a majority, and the correct 
result is voted out by the voting algorithm. Aliasing risk is determined by the fault cone 
associated with each potential fault in a system. A fault cone refers to the propagation of 
a fault through a processing element to the output bits where the fault becomes 
observable. Figure 8 illustrates graphically the effect of fault cones within a processing 
element. The fault f1 affects output bits 1 and 2, f2 affects output bits 5 and 6, and f3 
affects output bits 3, 4, and 5. The issue of primary concern is the activation of f2 and f3 
faults simultaneously. Since f2 and f3 fault cones overlap across output bit 5, a scenario 
exists in which PE2 and PE3 may agree and create a majority. The fault cone merely 
provides a description of which output bits may be affected by a given fault. Some output 
bits in the fault cone may be correct when the associated fault is activated. When f2 flips 
only bit 5 and f3 flips only bit 5, then their outputs will mutually agree on the incorrect 
result. Equal, yet erroneous results are the source of aliasing and underscore the 
limitations of TMR.  
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Figure 8: Fault cone illustration 
The fault f1 affects output bits 1 and 2; f2 affects output bits 5 and 6; f3 affects 
output bits 3, 4 and 5. Overlap of f2 and f3 at output bit 5 indicates potential 
aliasing.  
 
Table 1 demonstrates how aliasing may adversely affect the outcome of the voting 
algorithm by casting out the correct processing element result. The correct result is 
denoted by X. The Y and Z values are different, incorrect results. In cases 1-5, TMR 
works as expected by identifying X as the passing result. However, in cases 6-8, the 
healthy PE is determined to be faulty due to aliasing. 
  
f1
i0 i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6 i7
o0 o1 o2 o3 o4 o5 o6 o7
PE1
f2
i0 i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6 i7
o0 o1 o2 o3 o4 o5 o6 o7
PE2
f3
i0 i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6 i7
o0 o1 o2 o3 o4 o5 o6 o7
PE3
f1 activated f2 activated f3 activated Bit-level voter Word-level Voter Comment
0 0 0 no fault observed no fault observed
0 0 1 f3 observed f3 observed
0 1 0 f2 observed f2 observed
0 1 1 possible aliasing: on o5 possible word aliasing f2 and f3 cones overlap
1 0 0 f1 observed f1 observed
1 0 1 no bit level aliasing indeterminate f1 and f3 do not overlap
1 1 0 no bit level aliasing indeterminate fl and f2 do not overlap
1 1 1 possible aliasing on o5 indeterminate
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Table 1: Aliasing in TMR 
Identity A x B = X 
Case Input 
PE1 
Result 
PE2 
Result 
PE3 
Result 
PE1 
Vote 
PE2 
Vote 
PE3 
Vote Voting Result Disposition 
1 A x B X X X Pass Pass Pass No Fault Correct 
2 A x B Y X X Fail Pass Pass PE1 Faulty Correct 
3 A x B X Y X Pass Fail Pass PE2 Faulty Correct 
4 A x B X X Y Pass Pass Fail PE3 Faulty Correct 
5 A x B X Y Z Fail Fail Fail Indeterminate Correct 
6 A x B X Y Y Fail Pass Pass PE1 Faulty Incorrect 
7 A x B Y X Y Pass Fail Pass PE2 Faulty Incorrect 
8 A x B Y Y X Pass Pass Fail PE3 Faulty Incorrect 
  
Table 1 demonstrates outcomes using word-level voting. Bit-level and word-level 
voting methodologies are not equivalent. Bit-level voting never reaches an indeterminate 
outcome since there are only two possible values (logic 0 and logic 1) that may be 
contained in each bit. Since there are an odd number of PE’s, a majority will always be 
observed for each bit. Word-level voting may reach an indeterminate outcome when all 
PE’s compute different results. An indeterminate voting result is a useful indicator that at 
least two processing elements contain faults. 
In this thesis, time-distributed voting (TDV) is proposed. TDV is an alternative 
methodology to lockstep TMR that is developed to address cases when one or two PE’s 
are faulty. The TDV method is to observe majority voting outcomes over time. Faulty 
PE’s may not be wrong all the time. When a fault is not activated by the input pattern, the 
result will be correct and the faulty PE will vote in agreement with the healthy PE. A 
statistical opportunity exists for faulty PE(s) to help identify the healthy PE(s). Fault 
cones provide insight to cases where TDV may be successful. If the fault cones for two 
faulty PE’s do not overlap, then aliasing cannot occur, and all observed majority voting 
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outcomes will favor the healthy PE. Effectively, the PE’s are in competition with each 
other and the highest scoring PE(s) is the winner. 
TDV is an active fault tolerant method which attempts to identify faulty PE’s, 
rather than mask erroneous results. Conceding that multiple PE’s may be faulty, removes 
the benefit of voting in lockstep since doing so would propagate faulty results. The 
proposed design removes the lockstep constraint and enables each PE to operate on its 
own independent data stream. In order to create voting opportunities, pseudorandom 
input patterns are interleaved into the independent data streams for each PE at a fixed 
rate. The pseudorandom patterns are capable of providing high fault coverage of all 
possible faults in the PE. Since the lockstep constraint is removed, a mechanism is 
required that can identify patterns common to all data streams, capture the PE results 
when they become available and execute the majority voting algorithm. In this thesis, the 
content addressable memory (CAM) has been chosen to handle commonality detection 
and capture the appropriate PE results. The next section provides an overview of the 
CAM used in the proposed design. 
2.5 Content Addressable Memory (CAM) 
The methodology proposed in this thesis allows multiple processing elements 
(PE) to operate on independent data streams. Each PE may operate on a different input 
pattern in each computation cycle. Majority voting is no longer viable for every 
computation cycle. Instead, voting occurs when patterns are observed to be common to 
all input data streams. Due to the continuous nature of streaming data, the entire data 
stream cannot be searched simultaneously. In order to observe commonalities, a window 
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must be drawn around the portion of each data stream closest to the processing element. 
The window is implemented as a first-in-first-out (FIFO) buffer. The input pattern getting 
processed during a computation cycle is referred to as the active input. Commonalities 
are observed by searching each FIFO buffer for the active inputs from the mutually 
exclusive data streams. Figure 9 illustrates how commonalities are detected. The arrows 
indicate the active input for each data stream. In the FIFO, data remains stationary while 
a pointer cycles through each location within the buffer. After the data is used, it is 
replaced with the next input pattern from the data stream.  
 
Figure 9: Data stream commonality detection 
The active input (116) in Stream[1] is common to Stream[0] and Stream[2]. When 
this commonality is detected and the results aligned, majority voting is executed. 
 
The active input (116) from Stream[1] exists in both Stream[0] and Stream[2]. If 
the results are captured and aligned, a majority voting opportunity exists. The voting 
opportunity is realized by storing the PE_Output[1] value obtained in the current clock 
cycle as well as PE_Output[0] and PE_Output[2] when they become available in future 
clock cycles. When all PE_Output results become available, the majority voting 
Stream[0] Stream[1] Stream[2]
9 108 13C 136
8 FF 119 109
7 137 136 116
6 11C 13A 101
5 → 132 → 116 → 12E
4 100 112 111
3 12C 11E 117
2 116 114 108
1 117 110 114
0 13D 117 119
PE_REG[0] 132 PE_REG[1] 116 PE_REG[2] 12E
PE_Output[0] B2 PE_Output[1] 96 PE_Output[2] AE
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algorithm will be executed to determine if any faults are observed. In the proposed 
design, content addressable memory (CAM) cells have been used to construct the FIFO 
buffers for each processing element. CAM cells enable a fully associative search of the 
FIFO buffers for the active input patterns from the other two data streams. The search is 
completed in a single clock cycle. 
The CAM cell design requires a memory element, search lines, match lines, and 
comparison circuitry. Figure 10 from [7] shows cascaded NOR-type CAM cells with a 
timing diagram. During SL precharge, slpre is asserted to precharge low all search lines 
(SL, SL  ). During ML precharge, mlpre   is de-asserted to precharge ML high. Once 
ML is high, slpre and mlpre are de-asserted and ML evaluate begins. For each stored bit, 
either SL or SL  is asserted high to assert the search value. If the search value does not 
match the stored value, a discharge path is established for ML to reflect the mismatch. 
NOR-type CAM cells discharge the ML whenever any stored bit is mismatched to its 
corresponding search value [7]. If the stored value matches the search value for all bits in 
the word, the ML value remains high to indicate the match. 
Figure 11 from [10] shows a cascaded NAND-type CAM. The NAND-type CAM 
differs from the NOR-type in that the ML discharge path is established serially through 
each bitcell’s pass transistor. NAND-type CAM cells use the same timing diagram shown 
in Figure 10, except the ML is discharged only when the stored value and the search 
value match. 
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Figure 10: NOR-type CAM with timing diagram[10] 
 
 
Figure 11: NAND-type CAM cell[10] 
When any bit-cell value Q matches its associated search line value SL, a current 
path is created to discharge the match line ML_A through the matching bit. A 
mismatch is indicated by the ML_A signal maintaining an active high value. 
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Circuit designers can optimize power consumption and performance by selecting 
an appropriate CAM topology. Power is consumed each time the ML in a CAM cell is 
pre-charged from low or discharged due to a search event. If ML is rarely discharged, the 
CAM will consume less power. In the proposed design, data stream commonalities are 
expected to be rare events compared to cycles where no commonality is detected. The 
NAND-type CAM is ideal because ML will only be discharged in the rare cases that a 
commonality is detected. If a NOR-type CAM were used for this design, the match line 
would be discharged for every input cycle where a commonality is not observed, 
consuming more power. 
The CAM topology affects performance and requires additional area for storage 
and match detection circuitry. Area is determined by the size of memory array needed 
and the number of search fields implemented. Performance is determined by the delay 
associated with pre-charging and discharging ML. A NOR-type CAM is typically faster 
than a NAND-type CAM because the NOR-type CAM can discharge the match line 
through any one or more mismatched bitcells. The NAND-type CAM discharges the ML 
serially through all bitcells when a match is observed.  
2.6 Processing Element: The ISCAS 85 C6288 Benchmark 
The ISCAS ‘85 C6288 benchmark circuit was used to evaluate the proposed 
design. The C6288 benchmark is a matrix implementation of a 16-bit multiplier utilizing 
32 input bits, and 32 output bits. The Verilog implementation of the benchmark contains 
2448 discrete nodes. Each node may be simulated as a stuck-at-0 (SA0) or a stuck-at-1 
(SA1) fault. The benchmark provides 4,896 possible faults to evaluate the design. 
  
22 
Articles for the C6288 benchmark provide a minimum set of 12 engineered test patterns 
for fault testing [3]. The C6288 multiplier consists of a 15x16 matrix of full and half 
adders as shown in Figure 12. Each half or full adder is implemented as shown in Figure 
13 with interconnectivity described in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 12: ISCAS-85 C6288 16x16 Multiplier [3] 
 
 
Figure 13: Adder module used in C6288 benchmark [3] 
The 15 top-row half adders lack the C_i input; each has two inverters at locations 
V. The single half adder in the bottom row lacks the B input, thereby acquiring two 
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inverters at locations W. 
 
 
Figure 14: Alternate depiction of C6288 Multiplier showing connectivity [3] 
The input combinations are AND’ed together to form input to the half and full 
adders. 
 
Each row in the C6288 matrix computes a partial product used in the 
multiplication. The output bits are computed by summing the skewed partial products for 
each column in the matrix and propagating carry bits to the left adjacent column. The 
Half adders used in the C6288 are modified full adders with one input removed.     
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Chapter 3 Design 
3.1 Methods 
Verilog HDL is used to facilitate evaluation of the time distributed voting 
algorithm. The C6288 benchmark is a structural Verilog implementation of a 16-bit 
multiplier. In order to evaluate the faulty behavior of the C6288, faults need to be 
injected. The faults that need to be injected are stuck-at-0 (SA0) and stuck-at-1 (SA1) 
faults for every node in the C6288 circuit. Fault injection in accomplished using Verilog 
force and release procedural statements. The force statement overrides a node’s logic 
value with the specified force value. Once the force statement is executed, the affected 
node holds the forced value until the release statement is executed. The release statement 
returns the node to its nominal behavior. 
Pseudorandom input patterns are used to activate the injected faults. The 
pseudorandom patterns were obtained using a linear feedback shift register (LFSR). The 
patterns generated in an LFSR have some uniformity as each pattern is identical to the 
previous pattern with the exception of one bit. To overcome this uniformity, LFSR 
patterns were only collected after completely shifting the previous pattern out of the 
LFSR. This method was used to collect 1,200 pseudorandom patterns for fault excitation. 
The faulty behavior of the C6288 is characterized, using single stuck at faults. A 
simple Verilog test-bench was used to force a fault in the C6288 PE. All 1,200 
pseudorandom patterns were then cycled through the faulty PE while collecting the 
results. This process was repeated for all 4,896 single stuck-at faults in the PE to generate 
a table with 4,896 fault rows by 1,200 input patterns. The data table is used as the basis 
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for simulation of fault combinations. 
The analysis in this thesis includes a characterization of fault pairs. A fault pair or 
fault combination is defined as two discrete single stuck-at faults injected into two 
distinct processing elements. The characterization is completed by exhaustively 
simulating all possible combinations of two single stuck-at faults in the C6288. A Verilog 
HDL prototype has been developed to demonstrate an implementation of TDV. The 
prototype, however, is not optimal for obtaining the volume data needed for fault pair 
analysis. Fault pair analysis was done by hashing fault rows in the data table to observe 
voting outcome’s when one PE is healthy, and two PE’s are afflicted by different faults. 
A Microsoft VBA script was used to perform the data hashing. The next four sections 
will provide a more detailed description of the processes uses to accomplish the analysis.  
3.2 Proposed TDV Design Overview 
Lockstep TMR is a passive fault tolerant technique which uses majority voting to 
mask erroneous data from a single faulty processing element (PE). Lockstep TMR is not 
effective when more than one PE is faulty. The primary objective of the proposed design 
is to improve fault tolerance in the presence of multiple faulty PE’s. Time distributed 
voting (TDV) is proposed in this thesis as an alternative to lockstep TMR. TDV is an 
active fault tolerant technique designed to identify which PE(s) are faulty and which ones 
are not. TDV achieves the same coverage as lockstep TMR for single faulty PE’s, while 
extending coverage to non-aliasing cases of multiple faulty PE’s. Conveniently, the 
proposed design may also lead to improvements in performance and efficiency by 
allowing redundant PE’s to operate on separate and independent data streams.  
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When a PE contains a fault, it may not generate erroneous results 100% of the 
time. A faulty PE only generates erroneous results for a subset of input patterns that 
activate the fault. The input patterns that do not activate the fault will generate correct 
results matching those from a healthy PE. This observation creates a statistical 
opportunity to identify non-faulty elements using word-level majority voting. In order to 
exploit this statistical opportunity, each processing element has an associated weight. 
Weights are updated every time a majority vote is executed. The rules for updating these 
weights are detailed in Table 2. In the case where all results match, no fault is observed 
and the weights remain unchanged. When a single result is mismatched, the majority 
weights are incremented and the minority weights are decremented by one. When all PE 
results are mismatched, multiple PE’s are faulty, but the majority vote provides no insight 
about which element is faulty or if all elements are faulty. In the case where all results are 
mismatched, the weights remain unchanged. 
Table 2: Method for updating PE weights based on majority voting results. 
Input Pattern Result[0] Result[1] Result[2] Weight[0] Weight[1] Weight[2] 
A X X X +0 +0 +0 
A Y X X -1 +1 +1 
A X Y X +1 -1 +1 
A X X Y +1 +1 -1 
A X Y Z +0 +0 +0 
 
 
As majority voting occurs over time, the updated weights form a prediction about 
which element(s) if any are faulty. The weights are interpreted as shown in Table 3. The 
X, Y, and Z values shown in the table represent final PE weights after TDV and are 
related as X>Y>Z. In all cases, the PE with the greatest positive value (+X) is identified 
as healthy. When two PE’s tie for first place (+X), both are identified as healthy. When 
  
27 
two PE’s contain values of smaller magnitude that are equal and opposite, (+/-Y,-/+Y), 
both are identified as faulty. When two PE’s contain values of smaller magnitude that are 
not equal and opposite, (+/-Y,+/-Z), both are identified as faulty with aliasing observed 
for some input patterns.  
Table 3: Interpretation of final PE weights after TDV.  
 
3.3 Prototype Implementation 
 The proposed design has been implemented in Verilog HDL. Verilog provides an 
efficient, logical environment for observing data flow and fault simulation. Figure 15 
contains the block diagram of the proposed design. Dotted lines indicate contributions 
from this thesis. The FIFO buffers deliver stream data to the processing elements. The 
CAM cells used in the FIFO buffers contain two search fields and two match line outputs, 
and are referred to as double-ported. Using double-ported CAM cells, the FIFO contents 
may be searched for matches to the active input patterns from the other two data streams. 
Each cycle, the active input for each stream is forwarded to a search field in the other two 
buffers. Table 4 contains the search field inputs for each buffer and the conditions that 
would identify a buffer’s active input as a commonality. When a commonality is 
detected, the input pattern is stored in the common symbol array and the corresponding 
Weight PE[0] Weight PE[1] Weight PE[2] Interpretation (X > Y > Z)
0 0 0 No Fault Observed in any element
-X +X +X PE[0] is faulty; PE[1] and PE[2] are not faulty
+X -X +X PE[1] is faulty; PE[0] and PE[2] are not faulty
+X +X -X PE[2] is faulty; PE[0] and PE[1] are not faulty
+X +Y -Y PE[0] is not faulty; PE[1] and PE[2] are faulty
-Y +X +Y PE[1] is not faulty; PE[2] and PE[0] are faulty
+Y -Y +X PE[2] is not faulty; PE[0] and PE[1] are faulty
+X +/-Y +/-Z PE[0] is not faulty; PE[1] and PE[2] are faulty (aliasing observed)
+/-Z +X +/-Y PE[1] is not faulty; PE[2] and PE[0] are faulty (aliasing observed)
+/-Y +/-Z +X PE[2] is not faulty; PE[0] and PE[1] are faulty (aliasing observed)
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PE result is stored in the results array. The common symbol array holds the common 
input patterns until results from other processing elements become available and majority 
voting occurs. 
Table 4: Commonality detection using CAM cell FIFO buffers. 
Buffer Active Input Search Field 1 Search Field 2 Commonality Condition 
FIFO[0] A B C MW1[2] && MW2[1] 
FIFO[1] B C A MW1[0] && MW2[2] 
FIFO[2] C A B MW1[1] && MW2[0] 
 
 
The common symbol array is implemented using triple-ported CAM cells. Three 
search fields correspond to the active inputs for the 3 FIFO buffers. When a commonality 
is detected, the common symbol array is searched to determine if the pattern is already 
present and add it to the array if needed. The common symbol array indexes into the 
result arrays to store latent results when common patterns finally make their way to the 
processing elements. Finite states in the PE are not considered when commonalities are 
detected in the FIFO. It is assumed that the PE’s contain only combinational logic since 
stated logic may change as input patterns progress to the PE.    
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Figure 15: Block Diagram of Proposed Design 
Data flows through the FIFO buffer, into the processing element, and to the output 
data stream. Surrounding circuitry (dotted lines) monitors for stream commonalities 
and performs majority voting when commonality results become available. 
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3.4 Implementing the Multi-Ported CAM in Verilog 
 The FIFO buffers and the common symbol array in the proposed design are 
implemented using CAM cells in Verilog HDL. CAM cells enable a fully associative 
search of the buffer contents. Each buffer needs to be searched for the active input 
patterns from the other two data streams. The common symbol array needs to be searched 
for the active input patterns from all three data streams. The conventional NAND-Type 
CAM cell only contains one search field. Additional search fields, match lines, and 
comparison logic have been added to the CAM cells used in this design so that multiple 
searches may occur concurrently. The modified CAM cells are described as multi-ported.  
 Two variations of multi-ported CAM cells are needed. A double-ported version is 
used in the FIFO buffers, and a triple-ported version is used in the common symbol array. 
The number of ports that a CAM cell has refers to the number of input search patterns a 
CAM cell can operate on. Figure 16 contains the Verilog behavioral implementation of 
the multi-ported CAM cells used in this design. The first snippet (lines 27-36) is the 
double-ported CAM cell which has inputs for the stored memory value (q), and two 
search lines (sl1 and sl2). The outputs (node1 and node2) are asserted high whenever the 
value of their respective search line input matches the stored memory value. The second 
snippet (lines 38-49) is the triple-ported CAM cell. It is identical to the double-ported 
CAM cell except that it also has a third search line input (sl3) and a third output (node3).  
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Figure 16: Multi-Port CAM modules in Verilog. 
The double-ported CAM contains a storage value (q), 2 search lines (sl1 and sl2) 
and 2 match indicators (node1 and node2). The triple-ported CAM contains a 
storage value (q),  search lines (sl1, sl2 and sl3) and 3 match indicators (node1, 
node2, and node3. 
 
A multi-ported CAM cell is instantiated for each stored bit in the FIFO buffers 
and common symbol array. All CAM bitcells for a word are connected serially using the 
same match line. When a match occurs, all node outputs for a corresponding search field 
will be asserted high. A match creates a discharge path to drop the precharged match line 
value low. In the proposed design, registers are used as the memory element while the 
CAM logic performs the search functions.    
A de-asserted match line, for any word in the FIFO buffer, indicates that the 
corresponding search pattern has been found. A commonality is observed when the active 
input word for any single buffer is observed to exist anywhere in both of the other two 
buffers. When commonalities are observed in the FIFO buffers, the common input pattern 
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is stored in the common symbol array. 
The common symbol array uses the active input patterns from the data streams as 
search fields. When a match is detected in the common symbol array, it indicates that a 
common pattern has arrived at the processing element and the result needs to be stored in 
the results array so it is available for majority voting. The common symbol array aligns 
the result arrays to their associated input pattern. Match lines are used to index into the 
correct position in the results array and capture the PE result when it becomes available. 
Valid flags are set to indicate the results are available. When results are available from all 
data streams for a given input pattern, the majority voting algorithm is initiated. 
3.5 Evaluating faults in the C6288 Benchmark 
Fault simulation is completed iteratively using Verilog force and release 
statements. Each possible fault in the C6288 is indexed in a table and associated with an 
integer value referred to as its fault node. There are 4,896 fault nodes in the C6288 
Verilog benchmark used in this design. On the first fault node iteration, no fault is 
injected, and input test patterns are cycled through the processing element to produce 
correct results. In subsequent fault node iterations, a single fault is injected into the 
processing element and the input test patterns are processed with the fault present. The 
Verilog code snippet in Figure 17 shows the proper use of the Verilog force and release 
statements to cycle through all the possible faults. 
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Figure 17: Code snippet for injecting stuck-at faults during simulation 
The force statement turns on a specific fault, release statement turns off the 
previous fault. 
 
 
The simulation generates a table with 4,897 rows and 1,200 columns. The first 
row (fault node 0) contains the fault-free or “Golden” results for all input patterns. Each 
subsequent row contains results for the same input patterns simulated with a different 
fault node. The resultant data table may then be hashed to observe the behavior of the 
system for any singular fault or combination of faults. 
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Chapter 4 Results 
4.1 Operational Verification of the Design 
 A voting opportunity exists when an input pattern is common to all FIFO buffers. 
CAMs search the buffers continuously to find commonalities. Figure 18 shows the 
observation of a commonality during simulation. Each cam_reg column contains buffer 
contents for one data stream with a depth of 32 words. Each row contains a 32-bit input 
pattern en route to a processing element. A buffer’s asserted hit bit indicates that it’s 
active input (pe_reg) has been found in all other buffers. In Figure 18 the active word 
from the middle buffer is common to the first and third buffers. When a commonality is 
detected, it gets stored in the common symbol array. 
The asserted hit bit initiates a routine that stores the common input pattern to the 
common symbol array (cam_comsym), captures the common pattern’s result in the results 
array (result_reg), and sets flags to indicate that the result is valid. Figure 19 shows the 
common pattern observed in Figure 18 added to the cam_comsym array and the PE result 
stored in the results array. When PE results for the common pattern become available 
from other buffers, they are stored and aligned in the results array with valid bits set. 
When all valid bits are asserted, the voting algorithm is executed as shown in Figure 20. 
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Cycle Count  2148 
  
hit 0 1 0 
pe_reg 32'hb31d1556 32'hffffd555 32'hba098745 
result 32'h0eed8cbe 32'hd5542aab 32'h624ce36d 
    
Index  cam_reg[0] cam_reg[1] cam_reg[2] 
[0] 32'h4dd52192 32'hfaca8cd9 32'h23c17f7a 
[1] 32'h26ea90c9 32'h7d65466c 32'h11e0bfbd 
[2] 32'hb31d1556 32'hffffd555 32'hba098745 
[3] 32'h598e8aab 32'h237f4ac5 32'h5d04c3a2 
[4] 32'h2cc74555 32'h91bfa562 32'hae8261d1 
[5] 32'h9663a2aa 32'hc8dfd2b1 32'hd74130e8 
[6] 32'h4b31d155 32'h646fe958 32'heba09874 
[7] 32'h2598e8aa 32'hb237f4ac 32'hf5d04c3a 
[8] 32'h92cc7455 32'hd91bfa56 32'h7ae8261d 
[9] 32'hc9663a2a 32'h6c8dfd2b 32'hbd74130e 
[10] 32'hffffd555 32'h3646fe95 32'hdeba0987 
[11] 32'h32598e8a 32'h9b237f4a 32'hef5d04c3 
[12] 32'h192cc745 32'hcd91bfa5 32'hf7ae8261 
[13] 32'h0c9663a2 32'h66c8dfd2 32'hfbd74130 
[14] 32'h864b31d1 32'h33646fe9 32'hfdeba098 
[15] 32'h432598e8 32'h19b237f4 32'hfef5d04c 
[16] 32'h2192cc74 32'h8cd91bfa 32'h7f7ae826 
[17] 32'h90c9663a 32'h466c8dfd 32'hffffd555 
[18] 32'h4864b31d 32'ha33646fe 32'h5fdeba09 
[19] 32'ha432598e 32'h519b237f 32'h2fef5d04 
[20] 32'h52192cc7 32'ha8cd91bf 32'h17f7ae82 
[21] 32'ha90c9663 32'h5466c8df 32'h0bfbd741 
[22] 32'h54864b31 32'h2a33646f 32'h05fdeba0 
[23] 32'haa432598 32'h9519b237 32'h82fef5d0 
[24] 32'hd52192cc 32'hca8cd91b 32'hc17f7ae8 
[25] 32'hea90c966 32'h65466c8d 32'he0bfbd74 
[26] 32'h754864b3 32'hb2a33646 32'hf05fdeba 
[27] 32'hbaa43259 32'h59519b23 32'h782fef5d 
[28] 32'hdd52192c 32'haca8cd91 32'h3c17f7ae 
[29] 32'h6ea90c96 32'hd65466c8 32'h1e0bfbd7 
[30] 32'h3754864b 32'heb2a3364 32'h8f05fdeb 
[31] 32'h9baa4325 32'hf59519b2 32'h4782fef5 
Figure 18: A commonality is observed   
A buffer’s hit signal is asserted to indicate the buffer’s active input (pe_reg) is found 
in all other buffers. 
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cam_comsym Results[0] Results[1] Results[2] Valid Adj 
[0] 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 4'b0000 4'b0111 
[1] 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 4'b0000 4'b0111 
[2] 32'hffffd555 32'h00000000 32'hd5542aab 32'h00000000 4'b1010 4'b1101 
[3] 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 4'b0000 4'b0111 
[4] 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 4'b0000 4'b0111 
[5] 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 4'b0000 4'b0111 
[6] 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 4'b0000 4'b0111 
[7] 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 4'b0000 4'b0111 
[8] 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 4'b0000 4'b0111 
[9] 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 4'b0000 4'b0111 
[10] 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 4'b0000 4'b0111 
[11] 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 4'b0000 4'b0111 
[12] 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 4'b0000 4'b0111 
[13] 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 4'b0000 4'b0111 
[14] 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 4'b0000 4'b0111 
[15] 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 4'b0000 4'b0111 
tally   -3 3 3     
Figure 19: Common patterns are stored in the common symbol array 
When hit is asserted, the common pattern is stored in the common symbol array 
(cam_comsym) and the active input result is captured in the results array. 
 
The tally values shown in Figure 19 and Figure 20 contain voting outcomes 
summed over time. The adj bits determine how the tally value for each PE is adjusted 
each time voting is executed. The adj[0] bit determines if the weights are to be adjusted. 
The other three bits, adj[1], adj[2], and adj[3], indicate whether the tally for PE1, PE2, 
and PE3, respectively is to be incremented or decremented. If a PE result belongs to the 
majority, its tally value is incremented. If the result is in the minority, tally is 
decremented. If all PE results are matched or all are mismatched, the tally values are not 
adjusted. After voting has completed for all test patterns, the PE(s) with the highest tally 
is interpreted as healthy. The PE(s) with the lowest tally is deemed faulty. The tally 
values are then reset and the process begins again. 
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cam_comsym Results[0] Results[1] Results[2] Valid Adj 
[0] 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 4'b0000 4'b0111 
[1] 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 4'b0000 4'b0111 
[2] 32'hffffd555 32'hd5542aad 32'hd5542aab 32'hd5542aab 4'b1111 4'b1011 
[3] 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 4'b0000 4'b0111 
[4] 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 4'b0000 4'b0111 
[5] 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 4'b0000 4'b0111 
[6] 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 4'b0000 4'b0111 
[7] 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 4'b0000 4'b0111 
[8] 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 4'b0000 4'b0111 
[9] 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 4'b0000 4'b0111 
[10] 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 4'b0000 4'b0111 
[11] 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 4'b0000 4'b0111 
[12] 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 4'b0000 4'b0111 
[13] 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 4'b0000 4'b0111 
[14] 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 4'b0000 4'b0111 
[15] 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 32'h00000000 4'b0000 4'b0111 
Tally   -4 4 4     
Figure 20: Voting is initiated 
When all results for common pattern are available, voting is initiated. Tally is updated to 
reflect voting outcome. 
 
4.2 Fault Coverage with 1,200 Pseudorandom Input Patterns 
Pseudorandom data may be used to test logic circuits. The number of 
pseudorandom patterns required to provide 100% fault coverage is heavily dependent on 
the circuit used as a processing element. The C6288 benchmark was selected as the PE. A 
pseudorandom sample of 1,200 32-bit patterns was collected. A sample size of 1,200 
patterns was chosen somewhat arbitrarily to be 100 times larger than the 12 patterns 
provided in the C6288 documentation. 
The 1,200 input test patterns were collected using a linear feedback shift register 
(LFSR) and only saving every 32
nd
 output pattern. The appearance of randomization is 
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improved by completely shifting one pattern out of the LFSR before the next pattern is 
taken. All 1,200 pseudorandom patterns were simulated with an ideal processing element 
as well as all 4,896 possible faults. The result of this simulation is a data table with 4,897 
rows and 1,200 columns. Each row represents a different fault state, and each column 
contains output results for one of the input patterns. From this table, all analysis and 
evaluations can be performed or derived to assess the design. 
Fault coverage was evaluated iteratively by cycling through each fault node in the 
data table to check for incorrect results. There were 17 SA0 fault nodes in which no 
erroneous results were observed for any of the 1,200 pseudorandom input patterns. The 
un-activated faults were mapped to their location in the C6288, which is shown in Figure 
21. Sixteen un-activated faults belong to the half-adder modules and one belongs to a full 
adder module. Upon examination, these 17 faults are not observable because there is no 
input combination that would ever cause these nodes to compute to logic 1. The fault 
nodes are therefore perpetually SA0 by virtue of the C6288 design. The remaining 4,879 
fault nodes are all activated by some subset of the 1,200 pseudorandom input patterns. 
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Figure 21: Half and Full Adders containing un-observable faults [3] 
 
Fault coverage for the C6288 benchmark has been calculated at several interval 
set sizes between 1 and 1,200 pseudorandom input patterns. Figure 22 shows the escapes 
(non-activated faults) and fault coverage with respect to the pseudorandom input set size. 
Escapes drop to zero and 100% fault coverage of the observable 4,879 possible faults is 
achieved with 150 pseudorandom input patterns.  
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Figure 22: Fault Coverage profile for C6288 Benchmark 
The top plot shows the number of faults that are not activated by the input pattern 
set. The bottom plot shows the fault coverage as percentage of observable faults 
that are activated by the pseudorandom input patterns. Both plots are shown with 
respect to the size of the pseudorandom input data set. 
 
4.3 Fault Coverage with Multiple Faulty Elements 
A lockstep TMR system effectively masks erroneous data if only a single 
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
1 10 100 1,000
E
sc
a
p
e
d
 F
a
u
lt
s
Number of Pseudorandom Input Patterns
Escaped Faults
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1 10 100 1,000
Fa
u
lt
 C
o
v
e
ra
g
e
Number of Pseudorandom Input Patterns
Fault Coverage
  
41 
redundant PE is faulty. This thesis considers the case in which multiple PE’s may be 
faulty. The structural Verilog implementation of the C6288 benchmark contains 2,448 
discrete nodes. Each node may be modeled as a SA0 or a SA1 fault. In total, there are 
4,896 possible single stuck-at faults. A simulation was conducted in which 
pseudorandom input patterns were used as inputs to three processing elements. The first 
processing element contains no faults and its result is designated as G (Golden). The 2
nd
 
and 3
rd
 processing elements each contain a single stuck-at fault from the 4,896 possible 
faults, and their outputs are designated F1 and F2 respectively. For this simulation, the 
faulty elements are associative and each fault combination is only simulated once 
(Fault1+Fault2 = Fault2+Fault1). The case in which Fault1 = Fault2 is discarded in the 
simulation because aliased results would be generated anytime the fault is activated. A 
total of 11,982,960 fault pairs have been simulated. 
 
"				" =
## − 1
2
=
4,8964,896 − 1
2
= 11,982,960 
 
The simulation used the data table from section 4.2 to hash together all possible 
fault combinations and capture the voting results for all 1,200 pseudorandom test 
patterns. The simulation output was written to text files with outcome statistics tabulated 
for several pseudorandom input pattern set sizes. Exhaustive fault-pair analysis was 
completed for a single point estimate with set sizes of 2, 3, 6, 12, 25, 50, 100, 200, 400, 
800, and 1,200 pseudorandom input patterns. Table 5 shows definitions for the tabulated 
statistics obtained during the simulation for each fault-pair. In the explanation column, G, 
F1, and F2 refer to the output results of the Golden, Faulty1, and Faulty2 elements 
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respectively. 
Table 5: Definitions for statistics obtained during simulation for each fault pair. 
Column Name Example Explanation 
Fault Nodes G_N12_N13 
1st element is Golden 
2nd element has fault index 12 
3rd element has fault index 13 
G_Tally 606 
Final tally vote count (unbiased) for 1st Element 
after input set has been applied 
F1_Tally 22 
Final tally vote count (unbiased) for 2nd Element 
after input set has been applied 
F2_Tally -22 
Final tally vote count (unbiased) for 3rd Element 
after input set has been applied 
ALIASES 282 Number of occurrences where F1=F2 
G_0_Tally 594 
Number of occurrences where there is no minority; 
No change to G_Tally 
G_1_Tally 606 
Number of occurrences where G is in the majority; 
Increment G_Tally 
G_-1_Tally 0 
Number of occurrences where G is in the minority; 
Decrement G_Tally 
F1_0_Tally 594 
Number of occurrences where there is no minority; 
No change to F1_Tally 
F1_1_Tally 314 
Number of occurrences where F1 is in the 
majority; Increment F1_Tally 
F1_-1_Tally 292 
Number of occurrences where F1 is in the 
minority; Decrement F1_Tally 
F2_0_Tally 594 
Number of occurrences where ther is no minority; 
No change to F2_Tally 
F2_1_Tally 292 
Number of occurrences where F2 is in the 
majority; Increment F2_Tally 
F2_-1_Tally 314 
Number of occurrences where F2 is in the 
minority; Decrement F2_Tally 
XYZ[derived] 312 Number of occurrences where G≠F1≠F2 
XXX[derived] 282 Number of occurrences where G=F1=F2 
 
 
 The statistic from Table 5 that is of most interest is G_-1_Tally. The G_-1_Tally 
counts the number of input patterns that generate aliased results for a given fault 
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combination. This count is incremented for each pattern in which F1 and F2 agree, and 
vote out G. Table 6 shows a summary of aliasing occurrences for different input pattern 
set sizes. Aliasing occurs with over 99% of the activated observable faults in the C6288 
benchmark. Only 28 activated observable faults never generate aliased results when 
combined with any other fault during this simulation. In a lockstep TMR system with 
multiple faulty C6288 elements, a substantial subset of possible fault combinations 
(approximately 3.2%) exist that will produce aliased results and evict the correct result 
for some input patterns. 
Table 6: Aliasing Summary 
Input Pattern 
Set Size 
Unactivated 
Observable 
Faults 
Activated 
Observable 
Faults 
Activated 
Observable 
Fault 
Combinations 
Number 
of Faults 
that Alias 
Number 
of Faults 
that do 
not Alias 
Percentage 
of Activated 
Observable 
Faults that 
Alias 
2 1577 3302 5449951 3288 14 99.58% 
3 905 3974 7894351 3946 28 99.30% 
6 398 4481 10037440 4447 34 99.24% 
12 111 4768 11364528 4734 34 99.29% 
25 58 4821 11618610 4793 28 99.42% 
50 5 4874 11875501 4846 28 99.43% 
100 2 4877 11890126 4849 28 99.43% 
200 0 4879 11899881 4851 28 99.43% 
400 0 4879 11899881 4851 28 99.43% 
800 0 4879 11899881 4851 28 99.43% 
1200 0 4879 11899881 4851 28 99.43% 
 
Table 7 shows the number and percentage of fault combinations that alias with 
respect to the pseudorandom input pattern set size. The fault combinations in the table are 
comprised only of faults that are activated by the input pattern set. Figure 23 and Figure 
24 graphically show the relationship between pseudorandom input pattern set size and the 
frequency of aliasing fault combinations. With fewer input patterns, some faults may not 
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be activated and therefore cannot contribute to aliasing. As the input set size increases, 
fault coverage improves and more aliasing fault combinations are observed. Figure 22 
showed that in this single point estimate, 100% fault coverage is achieved with 
approximately 150 pseudorandom input patterns. A larger set of 1,200 patterns increases 
fault activation and the frequency of aliasing in fault pairs. Figure 23 shows that as the 
input set size increases, the percentage of fault combinations that alias approaches an 
upper bound of around 3.2%. Figure 24 indicates this upper bound is around 380,000 
fault pairs. 
Table 7: Aliasing Fault Combinations. 
Pattern 
set size 
Total Activated 
Observable Fault 
Combinations 
Aliasing Fault 
Combinations 
Percentage of fault 
combinations that 
alias 
2 5449951 96361 1.77% 
3 7894351 145437 1.84% 
6 10037440 205827 2.05% 
12 11364528 276495 2.43% 
25 11618610 317298 2.73% 
50 11875501 353489 2.98% 
100 11890126 369431 3.11% 
200 11899881 377027 3.17% 
400 11899881 378817 3.18% 
800 11899881 379375 3.19% 
1200 11899881 379437 3.19% 
 
 
The simulation results have been filtered to include only the 379,437 aliasing fault 
combinations from the 1,200 pattern set. Over 99% of activated observable faults are 
found to alias with at least one other fault. The frequency that aliasing occurs for all 
faults is shown in Figure 25. The distribution shows the percentage of possible fault 
combinations that alias for all singular aliasing faults. For example, there are 797 singular 
faults that alias with 3% to 3.5% of other faults. On average each fault aliases with 
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approximately 3.2% of other possible faults. 
 
Figure 23: Percentage of fault combinations that alias  
Aliasing increases as coverage improves because more faults are activated. Only 
activated and observable faults can contribute to aliasing. Therefore, the percentages in 
this plot are given with respect to the total number of activated observable fault 
combinations for each input set size. 
 
 
Figure 24: Aliasing Fault Combinations 
As input pattern set size increases, observation of aliasing fault combinations increases 
to a finite upper bound. 
 
1.50%
1.70%
1.90%
2.10%
2.30%
2.50%
2.70%
2.90%
3.10%
3.30%
2 20 200A
li
a
si
n
g
 F
a
u
lt
 C
o
m
b
in
a
ti
o
n
s 
(%
)
Number of Pseudorandom Input Patterns
Percentage of fault combinations that alias
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
300,000
350,000
400,000
2 20 200
A
li
a
si
n
g
 F
a
u
lt
 C
o
m
b
in
a
ti
o
n
s
Number of Pseudorandom Input Patterns
Aliasing Fault Combinations
  
46 
Aliasing Frequency Distribution
 
Quantiles 
   
Moments 
 100.00% maximum 9.5857 
 
Mean 3.224832 
99.50%   9.4001 
 
Std Dev 1.637596 
97.50%   6.947 
 
Std Err Mean 0.023512 
90.00%   5.6071 
 
Upper 95% Mean 3.270927 
75.00% quartile 3.9373 
 
Lower 95% Mean 3.178738 
50.00% median 3.1128 
 
N 4851 
25.00% quartile 2.1439 
   10.00%   1.2781 
   2.50%   0.5154 
   0.50%   0.0466 
   0.00% minimum 0.0206 
   Figure 25: Frequency distribution of aliased fault pairs for all faults. 
Shows the percentage of possible fault combinations that alias for all singular faults. 
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 The distribution in Figure 25 shows three distinct modes. The modes are 
confirmed in the cumulative distribution plot shown in Figure 26. From Figure 26, 84.3% 
of singular faults fall into Mode 1. 11.7% of singular faults fall into Mode 2, and 4% of 
singular faults fall into Mode 3. Mode 1 indicates singular faults where aliasing was 
observed for less than 211 fault combinations. Mode 2 indicates singular faults where 
aliasing was observed for between 211 and 317 possible fault combinations. Mode 3 
indicates singular faults where aliasing was observed for more than 318 possible fault 
combinations. 
 
Figure 26: Cumulative Distribution Plot of aliasing fault combinations 
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There are two factors that contribute to the multiple distribution modes shown in 
Figure 26. These factors are proximity and propagation paths. Proximity refers to the 
spatial columnar distance between aliasing fault locations in the C6288 PE. 100% of 
observed aliasing fault pairs are either in the same column or in an immediately adjacent 
column in the PE. Figure 27 shows an example of fault proximity. A processing element 
that contains a fault in column P6, shown in blue, may generate aliased results with a 
processing element containing a fault in column P5, P6, or P7. No aliasing was observed 
for faults pairs that are more than one column apart.     
 
Figure 27: Aliasing Fault Proximity example [3] 
A fault in column P6 (blue) will have aliasing fault pairs located in all adder 
modules from columns P5, P6, and P7. 
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The number of propagation paths for a fault also contributes to aliasing and 
multiple distribution modes. Figure 28 shows the gate level schematics for the adders 
used in the C6288. Faults that can propagate to both Sum and Carry outputs will have a 
higher frequency of aliasing fault pairs than faults that only propagate to a single output. 
In Figure 28, the outputs of g1 and g5 have propagation paths that include both the sum 
and the carry output for the adder. Faults at g1 and g5, or faults equivalent to these, will 
have more aliasing fault pairs because they have more propagation paths. 
Figure 28: Gate level schematics of the adders used in the C6288 
Gates g1 and g5 may be propagated to both the Sum and Carry outputs. Faults that 
propagate to multiple adder outputs have a higher number of aliasing fault pairs. Input-
AND gates do not appear on each adder. They are shown here as options. All internal 
stuck-at faults for the adders are shown here. Faults shown in red are equivalent, 
collapsible equivalent faults that may be detected using patterns that would activate their 
equivalent counterparts. 
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Figure 29 shows the spatial relationship of aliasing faults and three distribution 
modes from Figure 25. The X-axis contains the fault node index and are ordered as 
follows:  
1. Range 1-64 contains SA0 and SA1 faults for the 32 input nodes.  
2. Range 65-576 contains SA0 and SA1 faults for the “and” gates that 
provide inputs to the adders.  
3. Range 577-4,896 contains faults within the matrix of adders. The adder 
fault nodes are ordered from right to left and top to bottom. Each “spike” 
represents one of the 16 matrix rows (partial product) in the C6288. 
The scatter plot in Figure 29 shows that the number of aliasing fault combinations 
is heavily dependent on the placement of the singular fault within a C6288 matrix row. 
Each matrix row in the C6288 is a partial product used to perform the multiplication 
function. A heavier concentration of aliasing fault combinations exists in the horizontal 
center of the C6288. The horizontal center of the C6288 is recognizable in the scatterplot 
by the 16 local maxima points. The local maxima points correspond to faults located in 
the centermost adder module of each partial product row in the C6288 adder matrix from 
Figure 21.      
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Figure 29: Fault Alias Spatial dependence 
The Node index (x-axis) provides information about the location of each fault in the 
C6288. Range 1-64 contains SA0 and SA1 faults for the 32 input nodes. Range 65-576 
contains SA0 and SA1 faults for the “and” gates that provide inputs to the adders. 
Range 577-4,896 contains faults within the matrix of adders. The adder fault nodes are 
ordered from right to left and top to bottom. Each “spike” represents one of the 16 
matrix rows (partial product) in the C6288. 
 
In Figure 28, the faults shown in red are collapsible equivalent faults. Equivalent 
faults exhibit the same syndrome. In single stuck-at fault testing, equivalent faults are 
collapsed such that only one fault is targeted for testing. Any equivalent faults are then 
observable when testing the single targeted fault. To make testing more efficient, all 
possible faults are collapsed to a minimal target set. A minimized set of input patterns is 
computed to activate the target fault set. During test, the circuit operates on the minimal 
set of test patterns to activate all possible faults. If no incorrect results are observed, the 
circuit is deemed healthy. The documentation for the C6288 benchmark provides the 
minimum set of 12 input test vectors. On average, with 4,851 observable faults in the 
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C6288, each input test vector activates approximately 404 faults. High fault coverage 
with a small input set is a benefit of using the single stuck-at fault model. Exhaustive 
research has been done to improve the efficiency of fault collapsing and test pattern 
generation. The C6288 is frequently used as a benchmark for evaluating the efficiency 
and effectiveness of algorithms to collapse faults and minimize test patterns [8][9]. 
Identifying equivalence in fault pairs is necessary to make testing of large logic 
circuits manageable. Testing a minimal target fault set with a minimal input pattern set 
requires that the tester already know the correct result for each input pattern beforehand. 
A comparator is then used to identify any mismatched results and label an element as 
faulty. Lockstep TMR methodology inherits the assumption that, at most, only a single 
fault is present. This assumption is maintained even though the processing element 
hardware must be triplicated and additional hardware added to instantiate the voting 
logic. The correct result is not known beforehand, and reliability is wholly dependent on 
the presence of two healthy processing elements. 
If two PE’s contain equivalent faults, then aliased results should be expected. In 
this thesis, aliasing has been observed in fault pairs that are not equivalent. Lockstep 
TMR may be a riskier scenario than conventional testing because the occurrence of 
aliased results extends beyond equivalent faults. The data collected in this work for the 
C6288 multiplier suggests that of all observable fault combinations, approximately 3.2% 
generate aliased results for a subset of input patterns. When a second processing element 
contains a fault, Lockstep TMR becomes less robust. The likelihood of propagating 
incorrect aliased results increases. Time distributed voting (TDV) is proposed in this 
thesis to provide active fault tolerant coverage when multiple PE’s are faulty. 
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4.4 Fault Coverage using Time Distributed Voting 
 The design proposed in this thesis uses time-distributed voting (TDV) to 
determine if processing elements (PE) are healthy or faulty. The tabulated result files 
contain G_Tally, F1_Tally, and F2_Tally. These tally values represent the final weights 
after accumulating majority voting results for all input test patterns. All tallies are first 
initialized to an integer value of zero. With each pseudorandom test pattern, a vote is 
executed to determine if and how the tally values for each PE are to be adjusted. If the 
three PE’s generate identical results, then the tally values will remain unchanged. If a 
majority of PE’s generate identical results, while a minority of PE’s generate mismatched 
results, the  tally values for PE’s in the majority are incremented and the tally values for 
PE’s in the minority are decremented. If all three PE’s generate mismatched results, no 
majority is observed and no adjustment is made to the tally values. After all test patterns 
have been processed, the PE(s) with the highest tally is deemed healthy. The TDV 
decisions are non-biased and are in no way skewed to favor the golden processing 
element. 
 TDV is not immune to aliasing, but it relies on averaging to provide robustness 
when multiple PE’s are faulty. When faulty elements generate correct results, they vote 
with the Golden element(s) to increase its tally. Ideally, after all test patterns have been 
processed, the Golden element(s) represents the dominant tally. Figure 30 contains the 
Venn diagram of the expected behavior for non-aliasing fault pairs. The green 
overlapping regions in the diagram indicate majority voting results that favor the Golden 
PE and to its TDV tally value. Ideally, TDV would always favor the Golden element(s). 
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In simulation using the C6288 PE, TDV was able to correctly identify the Golden PE for 
96.8% of fault pairs with no observed aliasing. 
 
Figure 30: Expected Venn diagram of Time-Distributed Voting. 
When Faulty1 or Faulty2 generate correct results (green), they vote with the 
Golden element. After processing all test patterns the Golden element is correctly 
identified. 
 
 Over 99% of faults in the C6288 benchmark have aliasing fault pairs. The aliasing 
fault pairs may be represented using the Venn diagram shown in Figure 31. Whenever 
Faulty1 and Faulty2 results are identical, but different from the Golden result, the 
G_Tally metric is decremented. If G_Tally is decremented too frequently, the outcome 
after processing all test patterns may incorrectly identify the Golden element as faulty as 
seen in Figure 32.  
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Figure 31: Venn diagram for aliasing fault pairs 
Here, the overlapping regions between Faulty1 & Faulty2 (red) adversely affect 
vote averaging for the Golden element. As long as the overlap of Faulty1 & Golden 
+ Faulty2 & Golden (green) is greater than Faulty1 & Faulty2 (red), TDV is able to 
correctly resolve the Golden element. 
 
 
Figure 32: Venn diagram when Golden element is evicted 
When Faulty1 & Faulty2 (red) alias too frequently, the Golden element may be 
erroneously evicted. 
  
56 
Pseudorandom input patterns are used in the simulation to activate faults and 
evaluate fault coverage. If the faulty PE’s contain aliasing fault pairs, the PE favored by 
the TDV may change based on the input set size. Table 8 shows TDV outcomes for select 
aliasing fault pairs using different pseudorandom input pattern set sizes. In Table 8, a 0 
indicates the TDV outcome was correct for the indicated number of input patterns. A 1 
indicates the TDV outcome was incorrect. The selected fault pairs show that TDV 
outcomes may toggle between correct and incorrect as more patterns are presented to the 
system. While aliasing coverage percentage remained essentially flat, the aliasing fault 
pairs that are covered may shift with different input pattern sets. Coverage may not be 
achievable for all aliasing fault pairs, but designers may be able to engineer input pattern 
sets to optimize coverage of aliasing fault pairs.  
Table 8: Aliasing fault pair TDV outcomes vary with input set size 
PE1 PE2 PE3 
200 
Patterns 
400 
Patterns 
800 
Patterns 
1200 
Patterns 
Golden N997 N2263 0 0 0 1 
Golden N4297 N4796 0 0 1 0 
Golden N752 N2514 0 0 1 1 
Golden N411 N3247 0 1 0 0 
Golden N1000 N2759 0 1 0 1 
Golden N997 N2008 0 1 1 0 
Golden N872 N1121 0 1 1 1 
Golden N868 N1121 1 0 0 0 
Golden N3162 N4676 1 0 0 1 
Golden N1823 N2577 1 0 1 0 
Golden N3508 N4513 1 0 1 1 
Golden N843 N3362 1 1 0 0 
Golden N3745 N4760 1 1 0 1 
Golden N435 N2694 1 1 1 0 
Mean(XYZ) voting results 60.83 121.61 243.29 364.88 
Mean(XXX)voting results 11.62 23.01 45.75 68.91 
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The bottom two rows in Table 8 shows the number of patterns for each input set 
size that generated identical results (XXX) and different results (XYZ). The occurrence 
of XXX and XYZ results trends linearly with the input set size. In total, there are 
approximately 11.9 million fault combinations that were tested during the TDV 
simulation. The simulation used three C6288 PE’s. One element was ideal (Golden) 
while 2 elements contained different faults (Faulty1 and Faulty2). The processing 
elements are intended to operate on independent data streams with test patterns 
interleaved into the data streams. Aliasing fault pairs were observed for over 99% of the 
activated observable singular faults in the circuit. Observing common test patterns in the 
three data streams created voting opportunities.  
Table 9: TDV outcomes for 12 ATPG patterns 
 
Test Patterns 12 ATPG Patterns 
% Correct No-Aliasing Pairs 97.52% 
% Aliasing pairs 2.48% 
% Correct Aliasing Pairs 0.50% 
% Total Correct Pairs 98.02% 
% Incorrect Aliasing Pairs 1.98% 
  
Table 9 shows TDV fault coverage for multiple faulty PE’s using the 12 
engineered test patterns for the C6288. Table 10 shows fault coverage as a count of 
passing and failing fault pairs with different pseudorandom input pattern set sizes. Table 
11 shows fault coverage as a percentage of all possible fault pairs. TDV correctly 
identified both healthy and faulty elements in approximately 96.8% of all fault 
combinations because no aliasing was observed. An additional 1.8% coverage is obtained 
by correctly identifying healthy and faulty elements in over half of the aliasing fault 
pairs. The remaining 1.4% of fault pairs are escapes in which the healthy element is 
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evicted in favor of a faulty element. Test escapes in which both faulty PE’s are deemed 
healthy and the golden element evicted account for 0.02% of fault pairs. An equivalent 
Lockstep TMR system provides no coverage for multiple faulty PE’s. In this single point 
sample using the C6288, the proposed TDV design provides the same fault coverage as 
lockstep TMR for single faulty PE’s and extends coverage to 98.6% of fault pairs that 
may occur when two PE’s are faulty.  
Table 10: Fault Pair Coverage Statistics by pattern set size (Integer count) 
Test 
Patterns 
Total Fault 
Pairs 
Correct 
No-Aliasing 
Pairs 
Aliasing 
Pairs 
Correct 
Aliasing 
Pairs 
Total Correct 
Pairs 
Incorrect 
Aliasing 
Pairs 
Test 
Escapes 
200 11,899,881 11,522,854 377,027 212,446 11,735,300 164,581 2724 
400 11,899,881 11,521,064 378,817 214,242 11,735,306 164,575 2276 
800 11,899,881 11,520,506 379,375 216,910 11,737,416 162,465 1942 
1,200 11,899,881 11,520,444 379,437 217,408 11,737,852 162,029 1902 
 
 
Table 11: Fault Pair Coverage Statistics by pattern set size (Percentage) 
Test 
Patterns 
Total Fault 
Pairs 
% Correct 
No-Aliasing 
Pairs 
% 
Aliasing 
Pairs 
% Correct 
Aliasing 
Pairs 
% Total 
Correct Pairs 
% 
Incorrect 
Aliasing 
Pairs 
% Test 
Escapes 
200 11,899,881 96.83% 3.17% 1.79% 98.62% 1.38% 0.0229% 
400 11,899,881 96.82% 3.18% 1.80% 98.62% 1.38% 0.0191% 
800 11,899,881 96.81% 3.19% 1.82% 98.63% 1.37% 0.0163% 
1,200 11,899,881 96.81% 3.19% 1.83% 98.64% 1.36% 0.0160% 
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Chapter 5 Conclusion and Recommendations 
This thesis has explored challenges facing semiconductor manufacturers and 
designers as defects become increasingly difficult to prevent. Fault tolerant methods, 
such as TMR, have been discussed as options to protect yield and improve reliability. The 
shortcomings of TMR are the motivation for research and the new fault tolerant 
methodology proposed herein. TMR’s effectiveness is limited to cases where no more 
than one processing element (PE) may be faulty. In practice, once a part is put into use, 
the onset of multiple faults is neither predictable nor preventable. When multiple 
processing elements are faulty in a TMR system, aliasing may cause the correct result, if 
there is one, to be evicted and an incorrect result to be propagated. 
The methodology proposed in this thesis is an active fault tolerant technique with 
the ability to distinguish faulty elements from healthy elements in the presence of single 
or multiple faults. Time distributed voting (TDV) is proposed as a technique that 
accumulates voting results over time to recognize healthy PE’s. TDV has been 
implemented in a Verilog HDL prototype design. The prototype design evaluates TDV 
using the ISCAS ’85 C6288 benchmark as a PE. Simulations have been completed to 
verify the design and evaluate fault coverage provided by TDV with faults injected into 
multiple faulty processing elements. 
The TDV technique was able to correctly identify the healthy processing element 
for 98.6% of all fault pairs. TDV even provided coverage for some aliasing fault pairs 
(1.84%). Based on results using the C6288 benchmark as the processing element, TDV 
has successfully extended fault coverage to a system with single and/or multiple faulty 
processing elements. TDV does not ensure detection of faulty elements in all cases. 
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When PE’s contain aliasing fault pairs TDV may evict the healthy element as was 
demonstrated with 1.4% of the fault pairs in the C6288. 
Designers who consider using TDV should analyze the target PE to determine the 
frequency of aliasing fault pairs. This work has shown that aliasing extends beyond 
equivalent faults. Conventional fault collapsing does not capture all aliasing fault pairs. 
TDV may not be an appropriate design choice for PE’s with a large number of aliasing 
fault pairs. TDV may provide an effective alternative to lockstep TMR and enable fault 
tolerant design of systems in the presence of multiple faults. The following 
recommendations may further enhance the capabilities discussed in this work: 
• Adding more PE’s may further reduce the probability of aliasing faulty PE’s 
to conspire against the healthy PE. 
• Probability of aliasing may be reduced by using PE’s with the same function, 
but different implementation. 
• It may be possible to engineer a minimal test pattern set to further reduce 
aliasing and better evaluate the PE.   
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